Introduction

*
The post-Cold War era has seen many and serious disagreements among the Western allies, particularly between the United States and Western European countries. These countries had, for more than a half-century, formed a tight alliance. But the bond has weakened, and the change has accelerated as a result of events in Iraq in the past two Atlantic. This analysis provides a window on that pre-war period when most Americans expressed the wish "not to go it alone in Iraq", i.e. to find a coalition of countries that would support the American plans for intervention. The desire to gain legitimacy for the intervention made the involvement of the U.N. Security Council a critical factor in the * I would like to acknowledge the contribution of Yonatan Gelblum who assisted me with the research for this paper in the spring of 2004 and provided many valuable insights. I would also like to thank Thomas Patterson, Nancy Palmer and James Arbuckle for their thorough review of early drafts and their substantive and editorial suggestions.
pre-war period. Ironically, this factor appealed to those who did and to those who did not support war against Iraq. The requirement for Security Council approval was seen by some as enabling, by others as limiting, the use of force. At that time, United Nations weapons inspections in Iraq came to be seen by many Europeans as a means to prevent war through the "containment" of the regime of Saddam Hussein. Thus "giving the inspections more time" became the rallying cry of the European anti-war movement, and dissenting opinions in support of war became minority views in the countries whose governments opposed the war in Iraq.
There are several underlying questions guiding the exploration of these issues, but the central question is this: Were the differing public perceptions of the danger posed by Iraq a consequence of:
• divergent media reports, or
• positions taken by those countries' respective governments, or
• different political cultures?
The answers to these questions may lead to a better understanding of the transatlantic opinion gap. Although they cannot predict whether these disagreements will diminish as policy changes occur or whether the differing strands of public opinion are the result of a deeper paradigm shift of long duration within the Western alliance, this analysis is important because of the political implications of such a split for Western countries at a time when challenges from other regions, religions and cultures are increasing.
I have chosen Germany as the contrasting case with United States for two main reasons:
1. Germany is, despite the language difference, a European country with particularly close historic and cultural ties to the U.S.
2. The German government and public opinion from the outset were opposed to U.S.
military intervention in Iraq. In France, there was also governmental and public opposition, but arguably for other historical reasons. The U.K. and Spanish governments supported the U.S. in Iraq, but public opinion was opposed.
Thus the policy-media climate in Germany offers an obvious and direct contrast to that of the U.S .where both the government and a majority of the people supported a war against
Iraq. Among the issues dividing opinion in Germany and the United States are the legitimacy of the use of force in international relations and the role of intergovernmental organizations.
Do the media lead or follow?
During international crises, media in most countries usually operate within the sphere of a prevailing national consensus. Journalists as well as citizens are less likely to criticize their governmental leadership during times of perceived threats to national security. They tend to "believe" their leaders and, as a consequence, governments are better able to control the political environment than during more peaceful times. The aftermath of 9/11 was perceived in the U.S. as a period of acute crisis. At such times, when a country feels itself directly and continuously threatened, the political leadership can more easily enlist the media in building support for its policies. The media, especially those in the nation's capital, accept governmental cues with less skepticism than in more "normal" times.
Academic research has developed models that help us better understand this pattern.
W. Lance Bennett argues that the mainstream media "index" their reporting to the range of viewpoints expressed by governmental elites. If there is debate inside the government or between various governmental bodies, critical perspectives also appear in the press. If a policy appears to have bipartisan support, critical opinions will appear less frequently or disappear entirely from the political agenda.
Jonathan Mermin, a critic of the media, characterizes the effects of the indexing phenomenon in following manner: "The indexing rule is in clear violation of the watchdog ideal, as it is hard for the press to perform the watchdog function if politicians are granted the power to set the terms and boundaries of debate in the news. The analogy would be to a watchdog that consulted members of the intruding party as to whether it was appropriate to bark -not a very useful animal. Combining it with a model of "cascading" networks, where the "Administration" stands at the apex and the public at the bottom of the cascade, he asserts that the predominant "frame" travels from the executive to the other elites to the media, and then to the public. 3 In the case of the U.S., the Bush administration appeared very adept at "framing" the news and controlling the message in the build-up to the Iraq war. In Germany at this time Gerhard Schroeder was also able to frame his anti-war policy and dominate the news agenda with it. 
Policy certainty
Research Design
This paper will now explore the differences in reporting and published opinion in the United States and Germany by comparing selected critical events or decision points, and describing how they were portrayed during the six months prior to the war in Iraq.
One print and one television medium from each country are analyzed, using the Lexis/Nexis-database, 11 and supplemented with information from secondary sources. On German television the response to the Iraqi announcement was more positive: each side of the German political spectrum considered its political course on Iraq as "confirmed" by these developments. Chancellor Schroeder was seen offering German inspectors to the U.N., and Foreign Minister Fischer as describing these developments as a chance to prevent war. A day later, on September 18, the evening news was more pessimistic, as the U.S. was described as sticking to its "tough course," and President
Bush's efforts to gain congressional support for disarming Iraq were analysed .
Schroeder, by contrast, was shown as warning "not to put up additional demands" following Iraq's offer. discussed. The Vienna talks ended late on October 1 with a press conference during which Blix and ElBaradei confirmed that they would now have "unrestricted, uninhibited, unconditional access to all sites in Iraq" with the exception of the Presidential sites which were covered by separate agreement with the Security Council. 16 The New York Times on October 2 highlighted Hans Blix's statement "that "there is a willingness to accept inspections that has not existed before," but also suggested that Iraq's compliance was designed to forestall a new Security Council resolution. The Times also raised the issue of the presidential palaces by expanding on American and British charges that Iraq was using the eight compounds to hide elements of its chemical, nuclear and biological weapons programs.
Washington, Vienna and New York: Deliberations and Resolutions
NBC Nightly News reported on the Vienna talks, 17 but before doing so aired a two-year old Pentagon-video showing Iraqi forces firing at planes in the no-fly zone, followed by
Rumsfeld's claim that Iraq must be lying when it says it will cooperate with inspectors.
Both days the reporting ended on a speculative note citing unidentified U.S. intelligence sources regarding Saddam's ability to hide his weapons: "…if UN inspectors do get back…Saddam could drag out the process well into next summer, well past the administration's current deadline for war."
In the FAZ, the Vienna talks did not even make front page-news on will comply with the demands" but went on to say that the inspections must be given a chance to succeed.
NBC reporting on November 13 was also skeptical, noting that Washington "is ready to pounce on Iraq's disclosures" but that "other countries will likely want to overlook Meanwhile, at U.N. headquarters in New York, UMOVIC staff worked furiously to digest the Iraqi dossier. Hans Blix described in his book Disarming Iraq how, after one week's work a basic text of 3,500 pages had been culled from 12,000 pages which was then available to all members of the Security Council on December 17. There was, however, significant concern expressed by non-permanent members of the Council that Blix had allowed the entire dossier to be whisked off to Washington a week earlier for analysis. This concern was reflected in a flurry of critical news articles in the European media during the following days.Hans Blix briefed an informal Security Council meeting on December 19 which he recounts in his book:
I reported to the Council that our preliminary examination of the declaration had not provided material or evidence that solved any of the unresolved disarmament issues. At the same time I noted that while individual governments had stated that they had convincing evidence contradicting the Iraqi declaration, UNMOVIC was neither in a position to confirm Iraq's statements, nor in possession of evidence to disprove them. 
January 2003 -Reports and Accusations
The month of January was, in the words of Hans Blix, characterized by "lowered expectations and increasing tension." On January 9 he and Mohamed ElBaradei briefed the Security Council on their assessment of the dossier submitted by Iraq and the progress of inspections. Blix stated in his informal briefing that no "smoking gun" had been found.
The story made front-page news. Iraq's resistance to disarming." noting that the report was "tougher than expected." It also detailed Iraq's claim that it fully cooperated and that no weapons of mass destruction had been found. The Iraqi disclaimer was, however, followed by another story in which U.S.
officials expressed their conviction "that a terrorist camp in Iraq is a deadly weapons factory" for ricin and cyanide, which "is operated by Ansar al-Islam, a terrorist group with known ties to…alQaeda." On January 28 NBC reported that Iraq was preventing inspectors from interviewing scientists in private.
An editorial in the FAZ of the same day concluded also that the combination of threats, inspections and sanctions against Iraq was "the lesser evil." The FAZ also carried two articles giving the Iraqi perspective on inspections. German television on January 27 dedicated two thirds of its evening news broadcast to Iraq-related news. In addition to giving extensive coverage to Blix's report, it covered the U.S. reaction, the French position, Kofi Annan's comments, and U.K. Ambassador Sir Jeremy Greenstock agreeing with Germany on giving inspectors time to report again in mid-February. The
Tagesschau also interviewed Iraq's Sabri, who charged that the U.S. only wanted to secure the region's oil resources. Schroeder was quoted as reiterating his position that a military attack was not justified, and opposition leader Merkel was portrayed criticizing
Schroeder for taking a position before the U.N. report had been published.
A Crucial Security Council Debate: Colin Powell's Address
The Security Council meeting at the ministerial level in early February was anxiously awaited around the world. It was up to Colin Powell and Jack Straw to make the case for military action. In the event it certainly appeared that each made a particularly strong case, thoroughly documenting Iraq's non-compliance.
In hindsight it is clear that the credibility of Colin Powell, which was still very high in Powell's presentation on February 5 was entitled "Iraq: Failing to Disarm" and his main message was: "Clearly, Saddam Hussein and his regime will stop at nothing until something stops him." In the U.S. press, the speech was widely accepted as having presented "irrefutable" evidence and almost no media questioned his arguments. 25 Michael Gordon in a front-page news analysis of the New York Times of 6 February wrote: "Critics may try to challenge the strength of the administration's case and they will no doubt argue that inspectors be given more time. But it will be difficult for the skeptics to argue that Washington's case against Iraq is based on groundless suspicions and not intelligence information." Still, the editorial of the New York Times on February 7
continued to press for building a broad international position of support and for continuing inspections:
Mr. Hussein is a cagey despot, and he is certain to use the coming week to make a dramatic concession or two. But Hans Blix, the chief inspector for chemical and biological weapons, has demonstrated a stern resistance to eyewash, and the Security Council seems to be tiring of Mr. Hussein's antics. Coercive diplomacy has its limits -it didn't budge Mr. Hussein from Kuwait a decade ago. But it is well worth trying. The divergent response to the Powell speech can therefore be considered a turning point in the development of the public opinion divide. For Americans, the Powell-presentation in the Security Council was essentially convincing and the U.S. press did little to dispel the myth underlying his message despite rapidly unraveling evidence. 26 From here on in, regardless of what major newspapers professed, German public opinion was set against the war: the opinion divide was complete, even if the media divide was less apparent.
NBC Nightly News
Moving towards War-the Gap widens
Hans Blix and Mohamed ElBaradei made a last visit to Baghdad from 8 to 10 February during which they met with a number of senior Iraqi officials who, according to Blix, appeared by now "genuinely rattled": "We reminded the Iraqis that we had not asserted that there were still weapons of mass destruction in Iraq but also had not excluded it. Iraq had to stop belittling the unresolved disarmament issues as they had done in January, and start addressing them seriously". Why should we now halt the inspections?" The French concept paper for "beefing up the inspections" was also cautiously supported by Blix, and there were numerous other diplomatic attempts to regain middle ground in the Council during the next few weeks.
However, the impression was wide-spread that the time for diplomacy was running out. During these last pre-war days, personal attacks against the U.N. inspectors became more frequent, an experience which Hans Blix, in Disarming Iraq, describes at length under the heading "Bashing Blix and ElBaradei." While the diplomats on the Security Council tried to negotiate a resolution that all could agree to, the process proved too difficult, and the split widened between the U.S., the U.K and Spain on the one hand and Russia,
France and Germany on the other. This unsuccessful negotiating effort itself undoubtedly helped to deepen the transatlantic divide over Iraq.
On 17 March, Kofi Annan decided to withdraw all international UN staff, including the UNMOVIC inspectors, from Iraq, after he was informed by the U.S. the day before "that it would be prudent not to leave our staff in the region."
28
Summary of Findings
This comparative study of pre-war reporting confirms that in times of crisis media are culture-bound and are less likely to voice opposing views than in times of non-crisis.
During the period under review, the U.S. related to international affairs in a crisis mode, Waisbord has delivered the most damning indictment of this "patriotic journalism":
Patriotism became a measure of professional legitimacy that trumped quintessential values. The discourse of the "nation in danger" displaced values of democratic journalism such as dissent and fairness. The risk of patriotism eliminating dissent was ignored; instead, the risk of "terrorism" endangering the nation was prioritized…. Patriotism as chauvinism dangerously bordered on a culture of absolute integration which, as Theodore Adorno somberly observed, facilitates a politics of murder and destruction. 30 In the case of Iraq, the German government, given the country's historical baggage and cultural predisposition to oppose war, worked in concert with France, Russia and many smaller countries to continue and to strengthen the U.N. inspections regime. However, the policy of giving inspections more time to disarm and tighten controls on Iraq failed when the U.S., the U.K. and Spain decided that time had run out for inspections. The
Schroeder government had until then successfully framed its anti-war policy for its domestic audience. It had publicly opposed in an unprecedented manner the United States and Great Britain. The German opposition party criticized Schroeder's stance, but failed to make its case with the German public, and a large majority of Germans remained opposed to this war. Media criticism of Schroeder's policy as it appeared in the editorials of the Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung, also seem to have had little impact on public opinion.
As the German company Media Tenor has reported through its content analysis of German media, they did not critically distance themselves from growing antiAmericanism in the German public, but instead rode that popular wave. 31 The German media, while critical of Schroeder's foreign policy and the risk of becoming estranged from two close allies, in the final analysis did not contravene the government's anti-war frame. While there were more opposing voices, such as the FAZ, available to the German readers than in its neighbor France ‡ , the media generally jumped on the popular, anti-war band-wagon.
Outlook
Although there have always been latent political and strategic differences between Germany and the United States, these became more clearly manifest in the late Cold War ‡ French one-dimensional media reporting on this issue has been described in a study by the journalist Alain Hertoghe (La Guerre a Outrances ). Transatlantic policy discussions are needed to gain a better understanding of the respective roles and positions of the partners across the divide. The media on both sides of the Atlantic will also have to try harder to seek out and to appreciate opposing cultural and political views; at the same time they must regain their critical distance from their respective governments. In the period between the 9/11 attacks and the war against Iraq the media have largely relinquished their watchdog function, a critical function for democratic societies which must be restored.
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